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Reading Philosophy 
 
 
Simon Oliver 
University of Nottingham 
 
 
 
We often think that theology and philosophy have a natural association. As theologians, we 
expect to read texts and discuss questions which fall within the ambit of philosophy. For 
example, most students will engage with philosophy of religion in its various guises.  Such 
works might focus on specific questions concerning the existence of God or the problem of 
evil. A philosophical approach to religion might also include fundamental issues of existence 
and knowledge in relation to God, or the science of interpretation which we call hermeneutics. 
However, when we consider the activity of ‘reading philosophy’, what is it that we are 
invited to read? There are countless philosophical traditions which produce very different 
texts, from the dialogues of Plato to the lectures of Hegel, the treatises of Plotinus to the 
laconic notes of Wittgenstein. Each tradition has its own priorities, methods and questions 
which have countless theological implications. Likewise, theology has implications for the 
way in which we understand the nature and scope of philosophy. 
 
The practice of philosophical enquiry and the kinds of philosophical texts which we might 
read have changed significantly over the course of our intellectual history. Therefore, in this 
chapter I intend to take a broadly historical approach to the topic of ‘reading philosophy’. We 
will explore the different ways in which the philosophical task has been understood, and 
discover some examples of how one might read philosophy in its various forms. Initially, I 
will focus on the period prior to Christianity and the ancient Greek understanding of 
philosophy as a way of life. This influenced the kinds of text that emerged from the teachings 
of various philosophers; over time, they came to form the basis of philosophical schools such 
as Platonism and Stoicism. It was these Greek texts that proved critical to the formation of 
Christian teaching, so I will next examine the reading of philosophy by the Christian 
theologians of the first six centuries. Given that they possessed the treasures of Christ’s 
revelation witnessed in Scripture, why did Christianity’s first theologians bother reading 
pagan philosophy? This will lead us into a discussion of the relationship between reason, 
which is often associated with philosophy, and faith, which is often associated with theology. 
How does the reading of philosophy aid the life of faith? This will lead us to a consider the 
way in which philosophy is read in the Middle Ages. I will suggest that philosophy is not 
read in order to scrutinise theology; neither is it read in order to provide theology with 
rational foundations. Instead, philosophy is read in order to provide the tools to clarify the 
meaning and implications of the revealed things of faith. Philosophy is read with theology in 
order to aid the life of faith. We will then examine a significant change in the way in which 
philosophy is practiced, written and read in the modern period, using René Descartes (1596-
1650) as an example. Here, we find very different philosophical texts which are read in new 
ways. Finally, we will briefly examine the priorities of twentieth century philosophy, 
exploring the way in which the reading of these texts by theologians continues to be crucial to 
the theological task. Throughout this chapter, there will be three governing questions 
concerning ‘reading philosophy’: What are we reading? How should we read it? Why should 
we read it? 
 
Reading Ancient Philosophy 
 
When you think of a philosopher, what kind of character comes to mind? It may be an image 
akin to Rodin’s famous sculpture ‘The Thinker’, cast in 1902. A man sits alone in deep 
contemplation, his chin resting on his hand. The figure is almost enclosed; the body envelops 
a thought. This image reflects the view that a philosopher is a lone and thoughtful figure who 
is captivated by abstract ideas concerning our most fundamental and perplexing problems. 
 
This image of the lone thinker engrossed in abstract thoughts may be an appropriate way of 
imagining modern philosophy, but it fails to capture important aspects of the philosophy 
which influenced Christian thought in the ancient world. In particular, philosophy in ancient 
Greece was concerned not simply with ‘thinking’ in the abstract sense, but with an entire way 
of life. A philosopher – literally, of course, a lover of wisdom – was a particular kind of 
person who aspired to certain excellences or virtues. The philosopher lived ‘the examined life’ 
in which the practices of daily living were continuously scrutinised in order to achieve 
calmness and peace for the soul. This pursuit of a striking and strange form of life was 
undertaken within a number of philosophical schools that emerged from around the fourth 
century BC. Perhaps the most famous of these was the Academy founded by Plato (c.429BC–
c.347BC) which included Aristotle (384BC-322BC) amongst its pupils. To begin with, the 
Academy was little more than a private discussion group, but it evolved into an organized 
school for the instruction of students who desired wisdom. Importantly, philosophy in 
antiquity was concerned as much with the kind of person one should be and how one should 
live as it was with knowledge and experience. In other words, practical questions concerning 
how to live and act were knit together with speculative questions about existence and truth. In 
order to perceive truth, one had to live a certain kind of ordered and focussed life. 
Importantly, philosophy was a pursuit that was undertaken communally and by means of 
conversation and discussion.  
 
The conversational character of ancient philosophy meant that it was primarily an oral rather 
than a written tradition. This is not altogether surprising because the invention of the printing 
press that gave such prominence to written texts was many centuries away. This is why 
handwritten copies of texts, which required huge amounts of time and skill for their 
production, were so rare and precious in the ancient and medieval worlds. A scroll or a book 
was something of enormous value. Many students would hear, rather than read, a text. 
Owning their own copy was almost unthinkable, so texts were often committed to memory. 
However, there are other reasons for the importance of the spoken word and the centrality of 
such arts as rhetoric and persuasion to the discipline of philosophy. Many of these can be 
seen in Plato’s dialogue Phaedrus. At the beginning of the Phaedrus, Socrates, Plato’s 
teacher and the principal character in many of his dialogues, is taking a walk outside the 
walls of Athens. He is in conversation with Phaedrus who has been listening to a speech 
about the nature of love delivered by a famous Athenian rhetorician known as Lysias. 
Socrates expresses his great desire to hear Lysias’s speech and, suspecting that Phaedrus has 
a copy hidden under his cloak, Socrates persuades him to perform the speech. What is the 
significance of Phaedrus possessing a written copy of Lysias’s speech? To write down a 
speech implies that it can be repeated endlessly as the same speech; it can be read over and 
over again. The speech has, as it were, been ‘captured’. Once written down, the speech 
becomes a document to be passed on; the knowledge it contains can be bought and sold. But 
when Phaedrus reads Lysias’s speech, is Socrates hearing Lysias or merely a copy or echo of 
Lysias? Plato’s dialogue suggests that there is far more to a speech and the learning that it 
conveys than merely the written words. The context of the speech, including its time and 
location, the immediate purpose of the speech and the characters of its hearers, are all crucial 
to the speech’s meaning. Plato sees that the context in which wisdom is conveyed is crucial to 
a proper understanding and the attainment of a perfect state of being and knowledge which all 
philosophers seek. Towards the end of the dialogue, this leads Plato to suggest that the 
spoken word is of greater value than the written word. Why? Because the written word 
implies that wisdom or knowledge can be fixed, captured and endlessly traded. But wisdom, 
for Plato and his teacher Socrates, is drawn out of a student by conversation in which 
circumstance and context – the very form of life – are crucial. The spoken word is fluid and 
fleeting. It does not pretend to capture wisdom, but seeks it through the performance and 
movement of rhetoric. To make this point more simply, think of one of the most famous 
speeches of the twentieth century: Marin Luther King’s ‘I have a dream’ speech, so iconic of 
the American civil rights movement. Imagine the difference between reading this speech on 
the internet today, and the experience of an African American standing at the steps of the 
Lincoln memorial in Washington, DC listening to King’s oration on that August day in 1963. 
Surely to understand the real power and persuasiveness of Martin Luther King’s speech, one 
must remember its original context and the mode of its delivery, not simply words typed on a 
page or appearing on a computer screen. 
 
This is why rhetoric, persuasion and, therefore, conversation are so important in the practice 
of ancient Greek philosophy. When we read such philosophy, we must therefore remember 
that such documents were not intended to be read privately and individually. The treatises of 
ancient philosophy are frequently the edited notes of students or dictations to a scribe. They 
were written so that they might be read aloud with all the nuances of the original delivery. 
The principal means of conducting philosophy was oral discourse. The French classical 
scholar Pierre Hadot outlines the importance of this way of conveying the philosophical life: 
 
This relationship between the written and spoken word thus explains certain 
aspects of the works of antiquity. Quite often the work proceeds by the 
association of ideas, without systematic rigor. The work retains the starts and 
stops, the hesitations, and the repetitions of spoken discourse. Or else, after re-
reading what he has written, the author introduces a somewhat forced 
systematization by adding transitions, introductions, or conclusions to 
different parts of the work.1 
 
This helps us to understand why reading ancient philosophy is often so challenging. The 
pages of Plato and Aristotle will rarely contain the neat orderings of modern textbooks. These 
                                           
1  Pierre Hadot, trans. Michael Chase, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to 
Foucault, trans. Michael Chase, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1995, p.62. See also Pierre Hadot, trans. Michael 
Chase, What is Ancient Philosophy? (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
philosophical works are the written record of what was originally a shared conversation in the 
pursuit of wisdom and truth. In fact, the practice of reading privately and silently was 
relatively unknown in the ancient world. Texts would have been read aloud, communally.2 
Reading was an activity not simply of the mind, but also of the voice and the body.3 
 
So to learn philosophy in the ancient world was to be inaugurated into a particular school of 
thought whose aim was not simply to convey knowledge, but to train students in certain 
spiritual practices and forms of life which enabled the philosopher to see differently, beyond 
the immediate appearances of things. This was a training in how to look at the world in order 
to discern its meaning. Each school had its authorities and masters. Strict curricula were 
established whereby students would study authoritative works in a particular order, enabling 
apprentice philosophers to develop in a rational manner towards spiritual maturity. 
 
While the principal means for the conduct of philosophy remained oral discussion, from the 
third century BC a tradition of writing commentaries on authoritative works became 
increasingly popular. The so-called ‘commentarial tradition’ remained prominent throughout 
antiquity and the medieval period, up to the sixteenth century. We therefore have two kinds 
of text to read: the primary authoritative texts of the masters of ancient philosophy, and 
commentaries on those texts which are provided for the guidance of student philosophers. 
Just like the religious and Biblical traditions of Judaism and Christianity, ancient philosophy 
had its authoritative texts combined with commentaries on, or expositions of, those texts. It 
might therefore be best to understand philosophy in antiquity not simply as a set of abstract 
philosophical questions, but as a way of life in which conversation with a whole tradition of 
thought and practice features very prominently. 
 
So how are we to read these texts and enter the conversation of ancient philosophy? It is 
important to preserve something of the strangeness of the texts and the unfamiliarity of the 
world from which they emerge. As twenty-first century readers, there will always be a 
temptation to domesticate such philosophy and to read the texts through the lens of modern 
assumptions and priorities. So there are perhaps two key challenges of which we should be 
                                           
2 For an excellent account of the practical ways in which texts were read in the ancient and mediaeval worlds, 
see Peter M. Candler Jr., Theology, Rhetoric and Manuduction, or Reading Scripture Together on the Path to 
God, Grand Rapids, Michigan/ London: Eerdmans Publishing Company/ SCM, 2007, especially pp.1-20. 
3 See Dolores Warwick Frese and Katherine O’Brien O’Keefe, eds., The Book and the Body (Notre Dame: Notre 
Dame University Press, 1997), cited in Candler, op.cit., p.6. 
aware in our practice of reading. The first challenge is our tendency to assume that human 
knowledge and wisdom progress smoothly through time. We tend to think that what comes 
later in our intellectual history is more advanced, more correct, wiser or simply better than 
what belongs to the dim and distant past. Of course it is the case that since the seventeenth 
century we have witnessed remarkable developments in human understanding, particularly 
with regard to nature’s processes. Our technological abilities bring immeasurable human 
goods (advances in medicine) as well as potentially devastating costs (climate change or 
weapons of modern warfare). But despite all this ‘progress’, it is not clear that we are wiser 
or better people. For Plato, philosophy is not principally concerned with uncovering more and 
more facts about the world. As we have seen, it is really about discerning the nature of 
wisdom and the character of the good life. In these spheres, which are at once both 
philosophical and theological, we have far more to learn from the philosophers of antiquity 
than we might imagine. At the very least, the strangeness of the texts – and many are weird 
and difficult – should unsettle our modern imagination and help us to see things differently. 
So in order truly to read a text of ancient philosophy, one must allow the text to interrogate us, 
as readers, rather than understand ourselves simply as interrogators of the text. 
 
The second challenge that confronts us in reading ancient philosophy concerns our tendency 
to impose priorities, questions, categories or meanings which are alien to the text. For 
example, it is very tempting when reading a dialogue by Plato to think that the dramatic 
details are mere decoration behind which lie arguments which might be expressed in bare 
propositional terms. As we have seen with the Phaedrus, the genre of the text and the setting 
of the dialogue are crucial aspects of Plato’s argument that are integral to the way in which he 
conceives philosophy’s task. The text needs to be read as drama, literature and philosophy; 
for Plato, these form an integrated whole which work to persuade us (rather than compel us) 
to assent to the argument and vision being proposed. When you are reading a dialogue by 
Plato, it may be revealing to find some friends with whom you can read the text so that, as 
when reading a play, each person can take a different part and the conversational character of 
the discourse can come to life. 
 
Another example of the imposition of questions and priorities which, on careful inspection, 
are not wholly consistent with a text of ancient philosophy can be found in some readings of 
Aristotle’s great work Metaphysics. This work was probably compiled by an editor in the first 
century AD, around four hundred years after its various chapters and books were written. 
That same editor gave the title ‘Metaphysics’ to this work. For Aristotle, these writings and 
lectures are concerned with what he called ‘first philosophy’. This encompassed wisdom, 
theology (in the sense of the study of ultimate origins and purposes) and ‘being’ in its most 
general or abstract sense. Aristotle is not concerned with particular things – this table, that 
horse, the cosmos – but with being in general. In other words, this ‘first philosophy’ 
encompassed everything including theos, or ‘God’. Book twelve of the Metaphysics is one of 
the most famous and studied texts in ancient philosophy. It is particularly important for 
theologians because it apparently offers a significant proof for the existence of God. Put very 
simply, Aristotle seems to argue that the universe exhibits motion (by which he means any 
kind of change) and this motion must have an ultimate source or cause which is itself beyond 
motion. Modern philosophy of religion places discussions of the proofs of God’s existence at 
the very heart of its debates, so there is a temptation to assume that proving the existence of 
God is Aristotle’s primary concern in this central book of his Metaphysics. Many modern 
commentaries and discussions of book 12 take this approach; they assume that proving God’s 
existence by means of what is now labelled a ‘cosmological argument’ is Aristotle’s principal 
concern. But is the text all about proving that God exists? Take a look at the opening lines: 
‘Our enquiry is concerned with substance; for it is the principles and causes of substances 
that we are investigating.’ Aristotle goes on to discuss what he means by substance, and the 
different kinds of substance which he includes within his cosmology. Amongst these is what 
he calls ‘non-sensible and eternal substance’, which is God. But Aristotle’s principal concern 
is not simply to set out a proof of God’s existence in the formal logical sense. Rather, he is 
articulating a systematic cosmology which includes a particular view of an ultimate, eternal 
and unmoved origin. To read book 12 of the Metaphysics as if it were just a proof of God’s 
existence would result in a failure to capture the full extent of Aristotle’s purpose and 
argument.4 So presented with texts of ancient philosophy, it is perhaps important to heed one 
straightforward recommendation which is nevertheless sometimes easier said than done: read 
the text, the whole text and, to begin with, nothing but the text! 
 
Reading Philosophy in the Early Church 
 
For the first Christian theologians, the question was not simply how to read philosophy, but 
why read philosophy? It was not self-evident that philosophy should be treated as trustworthy 
                                           
4 For a close and attentive reading of Aristotle, Metaphysics Λ, see Helen S. Lang, ‘The Structure and Subject of 
Metaphysics Λ’ in Phronesis 38(3), 1993, 257-280. 
or valuable because philosophers were pagan thinkers. By contrast, Christians had received 
knowledge of a wholly different order in the form of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ. 
Writing at the end of the second century, the north African theologian Tertullian famously 
asked ‘what indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?’5 His question concerns the encounter 
between two very different traditions of enquiry and literature. ‘Athens’ refers to the 
philosophers of ancient Greece, chief amongst them Plato and his followers. These 
speculative thinkers analyse fundamental problems of existence and meaning through 
rhetorical argument. By contrast, ‘Jerusalem’ refers to the Hebraic tradition which we can 
most readily find in the Jewish law and the Hebrew Bible. This literature is not concerned 
with the carefully fashioned terminology of Greek rhetoric or logical analysis, but with 
meaning and truth as discerned in narrative, poetry and drama. In short, for the early 
Christian theologians the tradition of Jerusalem tells the story of a people, the Israelites, from 
whom was brought the Messiah, Jesus the Christ. His life, death and resurrection, told in the 
narratives and letters of the New Testament, is God’s revelation which is now proclaimed 
through the liturgy of the Church under the guidance and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. 
Although he used the tools of Stoic philosophy in his treatises, the implication of Tertullian’s 
rhetorical question is that the Church, being the recipient of the revelation of divine wisdom 
in the incarnate Word of God, should be wary of the wisdom of pagans represented by 
philosophy. Philosophers were regarded as the forerunners of heretics, not the forerunners of 
Christians. 
 
At first glance this attitude is understandable. If one opens a book of the Old Testament, 
whether it be the saga of Genesis, the prophecy of Isaiah or the poetry of the Psalms, it will 
be very different to what usually passes for philosophy. Yet the historical record shows us 
that there never was a pure and pristine ‘theology’, Jewish or Christian, which did not in 
some way engage with other intellectual traditions, including the philosophical learning to be 
found in ancient Greece.6 This is particularly evident in the writings of Greek-speaking Jews 
                                           
5  Tertullian, trans. Peter Holmes, De Praescriptione Haereticorum (On Prescription Against Heretics) in 
Alexander Roberts and James Donalsdon (eds.), Ante-Nicene Fathers vol.3 (Peabody, Massachusetts: 
Hendrickson Publishers, 1995), ch. 7, quotation appearing on p. 246. 
6 Acts 16.9 tells of Paul’s calling in a dream to ‘cross over’ to the Greek province of Macedonia from the city of 
Troas in Asia Minor (modern day Turkey). This ‘crossing over’ is taken as a metaphor for the journey of 
revealed faith into Europe and the encounter with Greek philosophical learning. See Pope Benedict XVI, ‘Faith, 
Reason and the University – Memories and Reflections’, a lecture delivered at the University of Regensburg, 
12th September, 2006: ‘The encounter between the Biblical message and Greek thought did not happen by 
chance. The vision of Saint Paul, who saw the roads to Asia barred and in a dream saw a Macedonian man plead 
with him: "Come over to Macedonia and help us!" (cf. Acts 16:6-10) - this vision can be interpreted as a 
"distillation" of the intrinsic necessity of a rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek inquiry.’ 
who obviously combine Athens and Jerusalem in their lives and work. The primary example 
is Philo, a first century Greek (or ‘Hellenic’) Jewish writer from Alexandria in Egypt. Philo 
merges the thought of Plato and the Stoic philosophers with Jewish narrative and scriptural 
exegesis. The theologians of the early Church, including Justin Martyr (c.100-c.165) and 
Clement of Alexandria (c.150-c.215), and those writing later in antiquity such as the 
Cappadocian Fathers (fl. late 4th c.), Cyril of Alexandria (d.444) and Augustine of Hippo 
(354-430), were educated in the thought of the ancient Greeks and deployed their methods 
and terminology to make clear the meaning and implications of Christian doctrina, or 
teaching. The Church Fathers had two favourite images for the use of philosophy by 
Christian theology. The first concerns the story of Jesus changing water into wine at a 
wedding in Cana (John 2.1-11). Christian theology turns the water of pagan philosophy into 
the rich wine of divine truth. The second concerns the Israelites taking treasures from their 
Egyptian captors as they fled into the wilderness (Exodus 12.33-36). Like the Israelites who 
put the treasures of the Egyptians to a higher use in the service of the one God, so Christian 
theology can take the treasures of ancient philosophy and put this learning to a higher use in 
clarifying the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 
 
So why did the theologians of the early Church perceive value in the philosophical teachings 
of pagans? We can highlight two reasons. First, ancient Greek philosophy as taught 
particularly by Plato and Aristotle and later, from around the 3rd century AD, by the tradition 
known as Neoplatonism, had discerned the fundamental importance of a transcendent ‘One’. 
Other ancient schools, including the various paganisms of the Romans, saw the origins of the 
universe and the fate of human lives to lie in the fickle and capricious behaviour of a plurality 
of gods. Not only did Plato and Aristotle make the discipline of philosophy more formal and 
critical, they also discerned the importance of a single source of existence and, therefore, 
truth. For Plato, this lay in the Form of the Good which, we are told in his dialogue the 
Republic, lies beyond being. For Aristotle, the final end of all things and the source of motion 
in the universe lies in a divine first unmoved mover who is fully actual. Seeing a single 
source of being and truth presents a philosophical problem that is very prominent in ancient 
thought: what is the relationship between that one transcendent source, and the many 
changeable things we see in the universe? How can temporal plurality come from eternal 
unity? The question of the relationship between unity and plurality lies particularly at the 
heart of Platonic philosophy, yet its discernment of unity as the divine source of all things 
clearly resonates with the key insight of the Hebrew scriptures: there is only one God. The 
monotheism of Judaism and Christianity is anticipated in the thought of the finest ancient 
philosophers. 
 
A second reason why theologians of the ancient Church valued philosophical learning lies in 
their understanding of the relationship between faith and reason, and hence their view of 
theology’s relationship to philosophy. We tend to think of theology as concerned with matters 
of faith and religious practice. It deals with God’s revelation in Christ mediated through the 
Scriptures and expounded in Church teaching and Christian life. On the other hand, 
philosophy is concerned with reason and finds its source in critical human thought. However, 
for many of the Church’s first theologians there was no fundamental discontinuity between 
the spheres of faith and reason. While God revealed himself most particularly in Christ, 
nevertheless we could also explore the things of God via philosophical reason as they are 
disclosed in creation. After all, the reason exhibited in philosophy was understood to 
participate in the Logos or ‘reason’ through which all things were made (John 1). That same 
Logos, or reason, was made known in the incarnation of the Son, the Word made flesh. So 
there is no discrete sphere of reason which belongs only to philosophy. Likewise, ‘revelation’ 
was not understood as a wholly separate stock of knowledge which suddenly arrives from 
nowhere in a way that is completely disconnected from the way that we think about reality 
philosophically. Revelation always has to have something to do with our reason, otherwise 
how could we recognise revelation and make sense of it?  
 
While the early centuries of the Church are an attempt to come to terms with the meaning and 
implications of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, in philosophical learning 
theologians found the tools and concepts which would allow them to make sense of the event 
of Christ. Therefore, Christian theology always involved a reading of philosophy alongside a 
reading of its authoritative scriptural texts. Theology and philosophy, and faith and reason, 
were always intertwined yet distinct. At the same time, philosophy was consummated in its 
service of the God-focussed reason of the Church. Philosophy was made more compelling 
and rational when it was put to theological ends. Hence we arrive at a broad consensus within 
both the ancient and medieval Church: philosophy acts as a handmaid to theology, not 
because of any deficiency or lack of clarity within God’s revelation, but because of the sinful 
weakness of human minds. 
 
It is for these reasons that the early Christians used a number of Greek philosophical texts for 
understanding the faith they had received from the apostles. For example, the categories used 
by the Cappadocian Fathers in articulating their Trinitarian doctrine of God were drawn from 
Greek philosophy. Augustine of Hippo (354-430), perhaps the greatest theologian of the West, 
was deeply influenced by his reading of the pagan Neoplatonist philosophers Plotinus (205-
270) and Porphyry of Tyre (c.234–c.305) as well as the Roman philosopher and statesman 
Cicero (106BC-43BC) and his dialogue Hortensius. While he was competent in reading 
Greek, Augustine more frequently read texts which had been translated into Latin. The works 
of Plotinus and Porphyry were available in Latin translation by Marius Victorinus (fl. 4th 
century). Some of Plato’s works were available to Augustine in Greek, but only a portion of 
the Timaeus had been translated into Latin and Augustine shows little sign of having studied 
Plato’s works. Nevertheless, the deep influence of Plato’s philosophy, and that of the 
Neoplatonists whose thought became dominant in antiquity, can be found throughout his 
writings. The reading of philosophy in this period was therefore not a straightforward affair, 
being a combination of engagement with translated texts and an oral tradition of teaching and 
learning. However, reading philosophy was clearly part-and-parcel of being a Christian 
theologian and teacher. 
 
Reading Philosophy the Medieval Way 
 
Around the sixth century, as the world of antiquity faded into the period we label the Middle 
Ages, the reading of philosophy by Christian theologians, particularly those in the Latin 
speaking West, at first became less and less significant. Crises in Christian belief surrounding 
the doctrine of God and the nature of Christ had been negotiated. The Councils of the Church 
had established a settled Christian teaching, making fulsome use of the philosophical texts 
and traditions at their disposal. Although a Christianised Neoplatonism remained prevalent, 
particularly in the Greek-speaking East under the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius (late 5th-6th 
century) and Maximus the Confessor (c.580-662), the texts of Plato fell into obscurity and the 
works of Aristotle were largely unknown except for Latin translations of, and commentaries 
on, two works: the Categories and On Interpretation. It was not until the twelfth century that 
Greek philosophy was read in earnest once again by Christian thinkers of the West. The 
scholars of the Islamic world had received and translated Aristotle’s works from Greek into 
Arabic. They also wrote commentaries on these works, enabling Greek philosophy, 
particularly Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics, to be taught effectively to students. Michael 
the Scot (1175-c.1232), an influential philosopher and mathematician, had acquired a 
knowledge of Arabic and was able to translate Aristotle’s works from Arabic into Latin. 
These works were re-introduced into the Latin West throughout the thirteenth century, 
spawning a range of commentaries by Christian thinkers. The most influential exponent of 
Aristotle’s ideas was Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-1274), the Italian Dominican Friar who spent 
significant portions of his life teaching at the new University of Paris. He was introduced to 
Aristotle by his teacher and confrere, the German theologian Albert the Great (c.1193-1280). 
Aquinas simply refers to Aristotle as ‘the Philosopher’ and makes extensive use of Aristotle’s 
works in composing his most influential treatises, notably the Summa Contra Gentiles 
(summary of theology against unbelievers) and the voluminous introduction to theology for 
beginners, the Summa Theologiae (summary of theology). 
 
Although Aquinas is sometimes described as an Aristotelian, he is not an uncritical reader of 
Aristotle’s works. Aquinas was educated within the context of an alternative and more 
prevalent philosophical school, Neoplatonism, and wrote commentaries on a number of texts 
in that tradition. He is therefore chiefly known as a synthesizer of the broadly Platonic and 
Aristotelian philosophical systems, all in the service of expounding the Church’s sacra 
doctrina, or ‘holy teaching’. 
 
How does Aquinas read Aristotle, and what can we learn from this reading? We should 
remember that for a large part of his career Aquinas was not reading Aristotle directly; he 
was reading a translation of a translation of Aristotle. Reading texts in translation, let alone a 
translation of a translation, always presents a challenge in preserving the authenticity and 
integrity of philosophical works. Nevertheless, Aquinas engages in a very detailed reading 
and interpretation of a number of Aristotle’s texts. We witness his reading at first hand in the 
twelve commentaries he wrote an Aristotelian works, some of them brief but many very 
detailed and extensive. Aquinas shows that Aristotle’s works are well ordered, yet they 
require critical interpretation. By ‘critical’, one does not simply mean that Aquinas sought to 
disagree with, or criticise, Aristotle. Rather, a critical approach is a discerning and 
interpretative approach to the text: what is crucial and what is less significant? How does one 
line of enquiry lead to and illuminate the next? How do the various categories and concepts 
illuminate one another? Can we discern a coherent and singular philosophical vision? What is 
the philosopher’s purpose as revealed in the text? 
 
Aquinas wrote commentaries on Aristotle principally as lectures for his students. Printed 
books were still centuries away, so this was the most effective way of conveying a body of 
knowledge to a wider audience. Aquinas’s students would ‘read’ Aristotle by listening to 
their master expound the key works and very often they would commit lengthy passages of 
Aristotle to memory. This reveals a very important characteristic of the reading of philosophy 
in both the Middle Ages and antiquity: one reads as part of a tradition of reading and 
interpretation. This means that one had to be taught how to read. It was not simply a matter of 
hearing Aristotle read aloud, nor even of ‘reading the text for oneself’ if one was lucky 
enough to have access to the manuscript. Quite the contrary: reading was a public rather than 
a private matter which was undertaken in conversation with one’s teacher, fellow students 
and a whole tradition of interpretation which could be accessed through readers and 
commentators of previous generations. Neither was reading philosophy a matter of being 
given a stock of facts or concepts which one then deployed at will. A student had to be taken 
by the hand and lead through a text, rather in the way that a tour guide might show a visitor 
around a city. The guide or teacher points to the text’s significant ‘landmarks’, relating those 
concepts and ideas to each other and to the history of the text’s interpretation. It is almost as 
if one had to ‘enter’ the text in order to inhabit its viewpoints and witness its trajectory. In a 
way, when we read novels today we adopt this style of reading; we step into the imaginary 
world portrayed by the author through the characters and the setting of the narrative. The best 
novels draw us in, almost turning the reader into one of the novel’s characters. For Aquinas, 
to read Aristotle was a little like reading literature. He leads his students – including us – into 
the text to inhabit the Aristotelian vision, to try to see the world as Aristotle sees it and to 
walk around within that world. 
 
This reminds me of some advice I received from one of my first teachers of philosophy and 
theology, himself a lifelong reader of Thomas Aquinas. He told his students not to ‘try to get 
Plato or Aristotle into our heads’ because our small minds would not cope. Rather, we should 
‘try to get inside the heads of Plato and Aristotle’. How? By entering their texts as readers in 
order to try to see the world differently with the eyes of Plato or Aristotle. 
 
The way that Aquinas uses Aristotle in his own writings is also very revealing. In a number 
of works, Aquinas arranges his material more-or-less according to the format of a seminar in 
the University of Paris. A general theme would be identified, for example, the eternity of God. 
Questions would be posed relating to that theme, for example, does being eternal belong to 
God alone? To begin with, Aquinas weighs up one side of the argument, for example that 
eternity does not belong to God alone. He offers a number of points in favour of this view. 
Then he offers an alternative view and provides a ‘response’ to the question. He often utilises 
a number of sources and authorities in articulating a response, including Aristotle ‘the 
Philosopher’. After the response, he replies one-by-one to the initial points made when the 
question was first posed. Throughout his writing, Aquinas places great weight on Aristotle’s 
philosophy and makes very careful use of his concepts and teachings. However, Aristotle is 
just one of a number of sources at his disposal including, for example, the Church Fathers, 
Pseudo-Dionysius and occasionally (although sometimes in order to oppose them) the Islamic 
philosophers and readers of Aristotle, the Persian Avicenna (980-1037) and the Spanish 
scholar Averroes (1126-1198). Of course, the supreme and focal authority for Aquinas is 
always Scripture. What is crucial, however, is that these various texts are read alongside each 
other, with Scripture as the governing heart of the discussion. Aquinas places them into 
conversation. As a Master of Theology he initiates his students into this conversation through 
a reading of authoritative theological and philosophical texts. It was as if ‘reading philosophy’ 
had its own broader intellectual ritual or liturgy. Importantly, it was also conversational in 
character, just like philosophy in ancient Greece. The conversation did not simply take place 
within Aquinas’s classroom; reading philosophy was also part of a conversation with a 
tradition of voices stretching back centuries. When we read philosophy publically, together, 
in conversation, rather than privately in our heads in a library, we are recovering something 
of the practice of reading philosophy in antiquity and the Middle Ages. 
 
Nevertheless, to be called ‘a philosopher’ in the high Middle Ages was not a compliment. 
Philosophers were pagan thinkers, even though ‘the Philosopher’, Aristotle, had, according to 
Aquinas, achieved great things. The ultimate purpose of reading philosophy was not to 
become a philosopher and then stop. Rather, philosophy was read in order to acquire an 
ancient wisdom which could provide Christian theology with a handmaid for the clarification 
of sacred teaching. The crucial point is that philosophy was deployed in order to think with 
the Christian tradition of reason as it is revealed in Christ who is the incarnation of ‘divine 
reason’. It was not the job of philosophy to scrutinise religious teachings or doctrine from a 
supposed neutral standpoint, but to clarify those teachings. When a conflict arose between a 
teaching of Aristotelian philosophy and the deliverances of revealed Christian truth, it was 
clear that the latter was to interpret and place the former, not vice versa. Perhaps the clearest 
example of a conflict of this kind concerned Aristotle’s teaching on creation. According to 
Aristotle, the universe is of endless time; it has always existed, although its motion finds its 
fundamental cause in the ‘first unmoved mover’ who is beyond change. This was at odds 
with the teaching of the Jewish, Christian and Islamic theological traditions that God created 
‘out of nothing’ or ex nihilo. This idea was contrary to Greek philosophy which claimed that 
‘from nothing, nothing comes’. For Aquinas, Aristotle’s position was quite defensible. 
However, the Church’s teaching was to be preferred because it was based on the witness of 
Scripture, the teaching of the tradition, and wider doctrinal concerns regarding the nature of 
God’s grace and freedom. Still, Aristotle’s thought could be used, even if negatively, to 
outline more precisely the distinctive meaning and implications of doctrines such as creation 
ex nihilo. To reiterate, philosophy was not principally used polemically to scrutinise the 
deliverances of faith and neither was it deployed to provide faith with rational foundations. 
Philosophy was to think ‘in parallel’ with faith, as Aquinas puts it in one of his early treatises. 
In the process, it is philosophy which is re-orientated and consummated according to a 
theological horizon.7 
 
Reading Philosophy the Modern Way 
 
The fortunes of Aristotle’s philosophy took a significant turn for the worst in the generation 
immediately after Aquinas. In 1277, Just two years after Aquinas’s death, the Bishop of Paris 
condemned a raft of Aristotelian teachings as contrary to the Christian faith. Yet the utility, 
power and comprehensive rigour of Aristotle’s philosophy meant that his works recovered 
their influence and came to dominate the schools and universities of the late Middle Ages and 
the Renaissance. Plato’s texts were also introduced to a much wider readership through 
translations into Latin by the Italian humanist Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499). To learn about 
nature, politics, ethics and metaphysics, one read (and probably wrote a commentary on) 
Aristotle. Meanwhile, Plato’s Timaeus was to have a significant impact on the character of 
early modern science because of his use of mathematics to understand nature, while his 
Republic influenced political theory. Philosophy was read for reasons which were not 
immediately connected to the priorities of the Church and the needs of theology. 
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The proliferation of Aristotelian learning was no doubt encouraged by the invention of the 
printing press in the late fifteenth century. At the same time, one cannot underestimate the 
effect of printed books on the practice of reading, including the reading of philosophy. While 
printing enhanced the transmission of learning to a previously unimaginable extent, it also 
made possible the private ownership of texts. At the same time, this allowed the private 
reading of texts. Thus far, we have seen the way in which reading philosophy was a public, 
communal and conversational practice undertaken in the context of a much wider tradition of 
interpretation and communal learning. Following the advent of private collections of printed 
books, a reader could sit alone with a text, scrutinising the text and coming to her own 
interpretative conclusions. It seemed that no training or initiation in how to read the text was 
required. The text was not encountered and received collectively, but privately by individuals. 
The reading of philosophy had become a very ‘interior’ or private exercise. 
 
How is this more individualistic approach to reading philosophy reflected in modern 
philosophy’s texts? René Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy, published in Latin in 
1641, is often regarded as a paradigmatic text of modern philosophy. The subtitle is revealing: 
‘in which the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are demonstrated.’ This 
philosophy might be read not in order to understand better the Christian theological tradition 
and the revealed things of faith, but so as to provide a rational foundation for religious belief. 
The very fact that religious belief was deemed in need of a rational foundation from an 
autonomous philosophy already implied that religious belief was in itself a-rational or, worse 
still, irrational. 
 
Descartes describes retreating alone to a room in order to question his every belief and search 
for an absolutely indubitable foundation for human knowledge. Eventually, that foundation is 
provided by his conviction that ‘I am, I exist’. This was later expressed in his famous cogito 
ergo sum: I think, therefore I am. There was one thing Descartes could not doubt simply 
because he was doubting: his own existence. If there is doubt, something is doing the 
doubting, this ‘I’ which is, according to Descartes, a res cogitans, a ‘thinking thing’. This is 
the foundation of his epistemology, or theory of knowledge. It also provides the basis for his 
proof that God exists. 
 
When I first read Descartes’s text as a student, it struck me as very strange and artificial, 
almost ‘experimental’; philosophy seemed to be disconnected from the communal and 
complex way people actually think and live. Descartes is fully aware that he is undertaking a 
specific and technical exercise of doubt; he commends it to his readers as something which 
might be undertaken at some time in their lives. However, the sense of the individual 
philosopher thinking in complete isolation stands in striking contrast to the picture we receive 
from ancient philosophy of the philosopher as part of a conversational school of thought. It 
seems that in modernity philosophy is not so much a way of life as a technical exercise in 
individual thinking. It suggests an image akin to Rodin’s sculpture ‘The Thinker’ with which 
we began this chapter. 
 
The eventual demise of the Aristotelian world-view in the seventeenth century, often 
associated with Descartes’s writings, is also regarded as the beginning of that characteristic 
period in our intellectual and cultural history which we label ‘modernity’. As well as 
developments in natural philosophy that heralded a radical break from that proposed in 
Aristotle’s Physics, new priorities emerged for philosophy, particularly in relation to theology. 
The reading of philosophy was now undertaken not in order to ‘think with’ theology and 
provide a handmaid for the exposition of sacred teaching. Instead, philosophy had turned to 
face and scrutinise theology. It was to provide either a rational foundation for religious belief, 
as in Descartes, or critically to examine religious claims according to the standards of an 
independent reason, as in figures such as David Hume (1711-1776) and Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804). Hume famously critiqued miracles in his An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding (1748) and the design argument for God’s existence in his posthumously 
published Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779). Kant’s Religion within the Bounds 
of Mere Reason (1793), one of the most influential texts in philosophy of religion, is an 
attempt to reduce religion to its most basic rational foundations. 
 
In modernity, philosophy came to be associated less and less with communal practices of 
reading and conversational thinking. Neither was it associated with schools and traditions of 
thought; this is part of modernity’s suspicion of tradition as a source of intellectual authority. 
One way of describing this shift in philosophical priorities suggests that certain strands of 
philosophy became increasingly abstracted from traditions and histories of thought, and 
evermore focussed on the establishment of a single category of ahistorical reason which is 
accessible to all.8 Philosophy was apparently seeking to establish its own rational foundations 
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devoid of any reference to theology or transcendence. It is during this period that philosophy 
comes not only to stare into the face of theology to lend to its rationalist credentials or 
pronounce the life of faith to be lacking reason. It also comes to stare into a mirror. One of 
philosophy’s concerns is itself: given the increasingly separate natural sciences, the new 
social and human sciences, and a theological discourse which seemed to be concerned with 
an evermore autonomous stock of knowledge called ‘revelation’ which lies beyond reason, 
philosophy was left once again with two pressing questions: what is philosophy, and how is it 
undertaken? 
 
In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, two very different answers to those questions 
emerged. One answer regarded philosophy as a set of canonical questions or issues that are to 
be pursued by making language as simple and transparent as possible. At its most 
straightforward and basic, the language to be deployed was that of symbolic logic, although 
so-called ‘ordinary language philosophy’ emerged in the later twentieth century to revive the 
use of everyday language in philosophical enquiry. This approach to philosophy was not 
concerned with history or tradition, but with a set of increasingly abstract and often narrow 
metaphysical problems requiring logical resolution. This school, which is nevertheless 
notoriously difficult to define with any precision, continues to dominate philosophy in the 
Anglophone world and has become known as ‘analytic philosophy’. It is associated 
particularly with figures such as Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Bertrand Russell (1872-
1970), Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) and G.E. Moore (1873-1958). 
 
A range of alternative answers to the question of the nature of philosophy emerged from the 
tradition of European philosophy which came after Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). It is 
associated with figures such as Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), his nemesis G.F. Hegel 
(1770-1831), the German poet and philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), the 
phenomenological school of philosophy founded by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and 
influenced by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), so-called post-structuralist philosophers such 
as Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), and those focussed on hermeneutics (the science of 
interpretation) such as Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002). Originally, the term ‘continental 
philosophy’ simply defined everything which was not regarded as analytic philosophy. In the 
broadest terms, ‘continental philosophy’ is concerned with the history and cultural context of 
philosophy and human enquiry. It avoids any simple empirical approach to philosophical 
enquiry and scrutinises the way in which we experience and interpret reality, regarding this 
not as a fixed and stable given, but as malleable and context-driven. Unlike analytic 
philosophy, continental philosophy tends to be much more sceptical concerning the power of 
modern science adequately to grasp the full reality of the world. On some accounts, a 
distinction can be drawn between analytic and continental philosophy with reference to the 
concept of ‘reason’. Analytic philosophy has been seen as committed to a view of reason 
which is often associated with the Enlightenment: reason is ahistorical, objective and 
accessible to all. By contrast, continental philosophy has apparently regarded reason as 
contextual and driven by traditions and practices of thought. It does not provide an 
independent ground by which to judge other discourses in purely dispassionate fashion. 
 
Much that passes for ‘philosophy of religion’ in Religion departments in the UK and America 
belongs more to the analytic school of philosophy; it structures its discourse around abstract 
metaphysical problems (proofs of God’s existence, the evidential force of religious 
experience, the problem of evil) rather than figures and traditions of thought in their context. 
However, an increasing number of philosophers regard the distinction between continental 
and analytic philosophy to be unhelpful and increasingly meaningless. Nevertheless, both 
approaches have something to teach us about ‘reading philosophy’. The analytic approach is 
often commended for its clarity and succinctness of expression. Meanwhile, the continental 
tradition pays more attention to the historical circumstances in which philosophy and 
theology are undertaken. Perhaps most importantly, it sometimes adopts a method which has 
been labelled ‘genealogy’ and is particularly associated with Nietzsche and the French 
philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984). Put simply, this approach claims that, like people 
and their families, concepts such as ‘God’, ‘society’ or ‘being’ have histories or ‘genealogies’. 
In other words, concepts do not have a uniform meaning throughout our intellectual tradition. 
They arise in different contexts and take on subtly different meanings. Those changing 
contexts and meanings can be traced ‘genealogically’. For theologians, this is crucial because 
the concepts we employ – God, evil, revelation, creation, love, reason – are used in very 
different ways throughout the tradition. To read and write theology responsibly, we have to 
be acutely aware of the ever-changing meanings and contexts of the concepts we use. 
 
So when reading philosophy (particularly modern and late modern philosophy) it may help to 
be aware that philosophers will have a range of views concerning the nature, scope and aims 
of philosophy. It is therefore particularly important to keep some key questions to the fore 
when reading such philosophy: why was this text written? In what context was it written, and 
for whom? What does it assume about the nature and task of philosophy? Is there an implicit 
theological perspective underlying the text? 
 
Reading Philosophy Today 
 
In the nineteenth century, the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche announced the death 
of God. In the early twentieth century, a philosophical school named ‘Logical Positivism’ 
announced the end of theology and metaphysics because their subject matters – God, for 
example – were not empirically verifiable and were therefore meaningless. Despite these 
attempts by modern philosophy to inoculate itself against theology, even the most cursory 
glance at the practice of philosophy in recent decades reveals that the disciplines of theology 
and philosophy continue to be ineluctably intertwined.9 Reading philosophy is an undertaking 
proper to any theologian, for in philosophical enquiry we find the ‘stretching’ of the human 
soul towards ultimate questions of transcendence which belong also within the ambit of 
theology. In this chapter, we  have seen how the practice of reading philosophy has changed 
as the discipline of philosophy has developed. We have referred to some very different 
understandings of what constitutes philosophy. We have also examined why theologians have 
read philosophy. Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from the reading of 
philosophy as it was undertaken by the earliest Christian theologians is that philosophy is a 
way of life focussed on conversation. Here, the reading of philosophy blends with theology 
because, as humans engage together in a philosophical conversation concerning truth, 
meaning and purpose, the claim emerges from Christian theology that God has entered that 
conversation decisively and corporeally in the incarnation of the Logos. At the point of God’s 
address in Christ, philosophy finds itself addressed. God speaks into human philosophy and 
history. In order to read that conversation rightly, we might ask a properly Platonic and 
Aristotelian question: what kind of habits and forms of life are required for theologians who 
seek to become good and able readers of philosophy in all its complex historical guises? 
Certainly patience to enter into the text, to inhabit the world of the philosopher who authored 
the text through attentiveness to context and history. Certainly humility to allow the text to 
speak for itself and scrutinize the reader. Also, love. Ancient philosophy spoke fulsomely of 
eros; it is a virtue one associates rather less readily with modern philosophy. The ‘lover of 
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wisdom’ was Socrates’s defining characteristic. Such love began not with the proud parading 
of a stock of knowledge or the clever techniques associated with the Sophists, but with what 
became known as a ‘learned ignorance’. As a philosopher, Socrates was first aware that, 
while others thought they were knowledgeable but in fact were not, he was aware of his own 
ignorance and was driven by that lack and the associated desire for understanding. Yet 
Socrates also understood that he was not an active enquirer beginning from scratch within a 
passive universe; he had been the subject of an address. Through the visible reality we inhabit, 
he had been spoken to by beauty, truth and goodness.10 The good reader of philosophy knows 
her own lack of knowledge, receives an address, and enters an ancient and complex 
philosophical conversation which eventually has to deal with the outlandish theological claim 
that God himself has addressed creation in his own incarnate Logos. 
                                           
10 See Plato’s dialogue Apology in which Socrates discovers that he is the wisest person because he is aware of 
his own ignorance. See also Simon Oliver, ‘Wisdom and Belief in Theology and Philosophy’ in Michael 
McGhee and John Cornwell (eds.), Philosophers and God: at the frontiers of faith and reason (London: 
Continuum, 2009), 231-246. 
